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On October 13, 011, BYU Studies sponsored a program reviewing Terryl 
 Givens’s important Oxford book on the idea of the premortal existence of souls 
in various lines of Western philosophy and religion. Because this first volume of 
its kind covers literature from so many different civilizations, the editors of BYU 
Studies saw no way to do this book justice without involving a panel of review-
ers from several disciplines. After portions of  Robert  Fuller’s forthcoming review 
in Church History were read, the program proceeded with reviews, responses, 
and open discussion. The following is based on that program.
•
Review by James L. Siebach— 
Philo, Augustine, and Classical Varieties
When Souls Had Wings is an engaging, expansive survey of the idea of the 
premortal soul in the Western intellectual tradition. The book seeks to 
unfold the idea’s “explanatory power” (5) in resolving certain problems in 
theology, in philosophy, and in human experience. In this review, I will 
rummage, by no means exhaustively, through the book’s introduction 
and chapters 2 through 5, asking questions about the author’s historio-
graphic assumptions and about the potency of the explanatory power of 
preexistence.
In his introduction, Givens defines premortality very broadly. Ver-
sions of premortality range from a soul as “a fully self-aware moral agent” to 
merely “raw material” used in God’s creation, yet Givens sets out to “encom-
pass the entire range and variety of beliefs that trace the origins of individual 
identity to some kind of nonphysical state before birth” (4). Likewise, Givens 
attributes to the concept of the preexistent soul extraordinary philosophical 
and psychological power. “Such belief structures, like all enduring myths 
Terryl L. Givens. When Souls Had Wings: 
Pre-mortal Existence in Western Thought.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
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and paradigms,1 persist because of their explanatory power.” And, like all 
successful paradigms, the concept of preexistence can “rationalize the incon-
gruities and traumas of existence” or simply explain “why things are the way 
they are.” It is clear that Givens endorses the view that the concept is endur-
ing because it is “more effective than others in the interpretation of human 
experience.” The concept of a preexistent soul has been used throughout his-
tory to explain other difficulties, such as “the human yearning for transcen-
dence and the sublime,” “the frequent sensation of alienation,” “the moral 
sense common to humanity,” “the human ability to recognize universals,” 
“unevenly distributed pain and suffering,” “the uncannily instantaneous 
bonds between friends and between lovers,” and “the necessary precondi-
tion for a will that is genuinely free and independent” (5–6).
As if resolving so many existential crises were not sufficient—can the 
concept knit a sweater?—the explanatory power of the idea of preexistence 
also resolves certain theological conundra. Givens explains, for example, 
that traditional Christian explanations of the soul’s origin at conception or 
birth are fraught with metaphysical and moral problems. “If the soul origi-
nates with the body . . . then why does it not perish with the body?” And, 
“If God creates the soul afresh in every human, how can it be imperfect, as 
a soul of fallen nature necessarily is? If it is created pure and innocent, how 
and when does it come to acquire the burden of Adam’s sin and guilt? And 
what justice can there be in immediately consigning a purely created spirit 
to the incubus of guilt, sin, and fallenness?” (2).
True, traditional Catholic or Protestant theological explorations of the 
soul’s origin are fraught with moral and metaphysical difficulties, yet the 
concept of a preexistence introduces other perplexities: Isn’t it still a prob-
lem that preexistent spirits from the presence of God enter physical bodies, 
yet humans are still so inclined to sin and fallenness? If a preexistent soul 
enters a body, why should parents, with power to create a body only, assume 
responsibility for anything other than bodily development? Why does a 
human person require so long a time to mature, the preexistent soul seem-
ing so passive during early physical and cognitive development? Of course, 
clarifying such difficult questions—along with a persuasive  articulation of 
how a preexistent soul influences the moral deliberation of the person—
would make any book a bestseller.
1. Ordinarily, a single concept or belief cannot function as a paradigm. A para-
digm is, most properly, a model of reality, and so implies a rich, structured network 
of beliefs. Givens doubtless intends, in calling the concept of preexistent souls a 
paradigm, to include the larger worldview logically associated with the concept, 
such as with Neoplatonic Christianity.
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Chapter 2 is a useful review of early Greek views regarding the soul’s 
always-existent, ungenerated, indestructible, and individuated “spirit entity.” 
Givens’s reading of Plato is subtle and sufficiently discriminating to note, for 
example, that Plato’s own commitments to the various arguments he put for-
ward for premortality are tenuous. He sometimes presented the idea in the 
context of a myth, and the doctrine was often merely instrumental in philo-
sophical exercises. In Plato’s Meno, Phaedo, Republic, and Timaeus, belief in 
the soul’s preexistence is useful in order to motivate human beings to live 
by the assumption that philosophical knowledge is attainable and that the 
philosophical life is the best of all possible lives.
It is debatable whether Plato continued to hold the same views about 
the soul’s immortality. (Aristotle never found the idea persuasive.) The 
Parmenides is a dialogue in which Plato subjects his own metaphysics to 
relentless criticism. After this dialogue, historically, Plato’s allusions to the 
soul’s immortality and preexistence are sparse. To say that Plato found his 
earlier views regarding immortality bereft of explanatory power is not sup-
ported by the evidence, though one may still reasonably wonder why such 
fundamental views did not find more discussion in his later works. Never-
theless, Plato’s early views have had an extraordinary historical influence on 
the idea of premortality, as chapters 3 through 5 unfold.
In chapter 3, Givens rightly emphasizes the extraordinary influence of 
Philo, an observant Jew living in Hellenized Alexandria in the first century BC. 
Philo’s importance arises from his considered synthesis of philosophical 
thought—specifically Platonism, Stoicism, Neopythagoreanism, and Aristo-
telianism—and the revelation of God inscribed in the Hebrew Bible. Philo’s 
synthesis is complicated by incompatible assumptions in two very different 
cultures: ancient Semitic culture and that of classical Greek philosophy.
Philo was conscious of contemporary Greek philosophers’ relentless 
criticism of the divine interaction with humanity as depicted in the Hebrew 
Bible: Does God really become enraged at Israelite disobedience? Is God 
really anthropomorphic, walking and talking in Eden? Would God really 
command the Israelites to destroy entire nations? Philo’s explanations of 
such representations introduce an important exegetical method: allegorical 
interpretation of scripture. Philo recognized that scripture has four different 
categories of sense—literal, allegorical, tropological, and anagogical—and 
the deeper significations of scripture resolve problematic literal represen-
tations of divine action. First and foremost an observant Jew,2 Philo also 
2. Philo scholars would not accept Givens’s assertion (40) that Philo was 
equally devoted to the revelation of the Lord represented in the Hebrew Bible and 
to the philosophical tradition represented in Hellenistic culture. 
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found ways to circumcise Athenian thought: he reasoned that Plato must 
have learned his metaphysics from Moses, else Platonism would not be so 
thoroughly discoverable at the allegorical level of interpretation. Although 
Philo “profoundly affected the development—and transmission—of the idea 
of pre-existence” (40), it is no longer clear what preexistence refers to in this 
section of the book—due partly to Philo’s Hebrew and Greek synthesis.
The discussion of Philo is not without other disruptions, particularly 
concerning a contentious problem in ancient thought: Was the world cre-
ated and generated, or did it always exist ungenerated? And if generated, 
was it generated from nothing or from eternally preexistent matter? At 
this point, readers may get confused because the question is no longer 
about the preexistence of the human soul but the preexistent status of the 
world and its elements. Philo gives deference to the Genesis narrative that 
implies a kind of temporal sequence to creation, as well as to the classical 
metaphysical “necessity” of God’s eternally constant creative activity. Even 
Philo seems to recognize the apparent contradiction and regards his view as 
imperfect: the human mind, so removed from such a transcendent divine 
nature and activity, cannot understand or put into language such creative 
phenomena. Considering such complications, a longer summary and more 
judicious citations would have helped the reader contextualize the book’s 
discussion on Philo and creation.3
Chapter 3 also quotes many passages from the apocrypha, pseudepig-
rapha, and early Christian writers. While it would go far afield to explore 
the extent to which second temple Judaism, Rabbinical Judaism, and Essene 
writings were influenced by Greek thought in their discussions of preex-
istence and immortality, this chapter’s review of New Testament writers 
suggests that the influence is extensive. Chapter 4’s discussion on Neopla-
tonism and the Church Fathers continues this theme, showing that the influ-
ence of Greek thought is not without criticism by those writing in the first 
few centuries after the death of Christ. Chapter 4 also suggests ways that 
3. An expert on Philo, David Winston charitably seeks to maximize the cogency 
of Philo’s argument, reasoning that Philo believed God created the world entirely 
outside of time, meaning the world, though created, was eternally so. Perhaps one 
of Givens’s least judicious readings arises when he characterizes Winston’s effort 
as “intellectual calisthenics” (334) to explain away preexistence. Far from denying 
preexistence, Winston seeks to prove that Philo undeniably asserts the preexistence 
of matter. Winston clearly has no agenda but to attempt to reconcile contradictory 
passages in Philo’s own convoluted accounts. For more detail on the creation, David 
Winston has a useful introduction, as Givens notes on page 334, in Philo of Alexan-
dria: The Contemplative Life, the Giants, and Selections, trans. David Winston, The 
Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1981). 
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Christianity in turn transformed an understanding of Plato, Aristotle, and 
the Greek tradition.4
Chapter 5 surveys the crucial role of Saint Augustine in the waning theo-
logical status of the idea of preexistence. Givens rightly notes (112–14) that 
Augustine, as a younger Platonist, believed that the soul (anima) preexisted 
its incarnation in an individuated person. When precisely Augustine gave 
up this idea is disputed, and a few scholars argue that Augustine never sur-
rendered the belief. As late as The Confessions, Augustine meditates on the 
soul and concludes that its creation is still an open question and certainly a 
mystery. In such works as On Free Choice of the Will and On Christian Doc-
trine, Augustine defines the highest of all wisdom as the aspiration to know 
God and one’s own soul; knowing one’s own self is on a par, almost, with 
knowing God. When Augustine was made Bishop in Hippo, he felt less lib-
erty to speculate on philosophical matters and a greater obligation to defend 
the Magisterium. Thus, Augustine devoted considerable time to refutations 
of Pelagianism, and those refutations undermined the idea of premortality.
Givens’s account of Augustine’s rethinking is generally reliable. How-
ever, one might defend Augustine by noting that if explanatory power—
solving theological and metaphysical problems—recommends the concept 
of a preexistent soul, by the same criterion the idea may lose persuasive force, 
for it can create theological and metaphysical problems as well. Augustine 
thought, with good reason, that premortality was nonbiblical and contra-
dicted the doctrine of original sin, which doctrine was interpreted by the 
church in Augustine’s day to have been taught by Paul. He also felt that an 
eternally existent soul impinged upon God’s divine omnipotence and abso-
lute sovereignty, because such a soul could by moral effort, theoretically, 
secure its own salvation and thus not be indebted to Christ’s saving work; 
thus premortality diminishes, theologically, the scope of Christ’s Atone-
ment.  Givens seems to suggest that Augustine’s revisions are less persuasive 
because they are the result of problem solving. Yet Augustine ultimately 
decided the idea of premortality introduced more problems than it solved 
(119). Thoughtful reflection on theological problems should not discredit a 
theological discovery, as Givens’s own tradition demostrates —with Joseph 
Smith, theological discord precipitated revelatory discovery. 
As to the work in general, When Souls Had Wings will be well received 
by those who share Givens’s metaphysical commitments. If readers already 
agree that the concept of preexistence has explanatory power, the book will 
4. In accomplishing this, however, Givens should not rely, except when com-
pelled, on translations over a century old. The work of Edwin Hatch and Adolph V. 
Harnack, being late nineteenth century, ought to be considered outdated. 
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fortify their commitments. Less sympathetic readers will require more sua-
sive arguments to convince them. Likewise, an audience less familiar with 
the primary texts will be satisfied with fewer supporting citations and more 
general interpretations. When the audience is more familiar with the origi-
nal sources, however, the interpretive burden upon the author increases 
proportionately.
For example, when Givens briefly discusses Homer’s Iliad, it should be 
remembered that this epic is a weaving of different and older oral narratives 
by different authors. Within the Illiad are at least two words (thumos and 
psyche) translatable by the word soul. The concepts signified by these two 
words are not synonymous, and even the same word for soul may have dif-
ferent shades of meaning in the text. Thus, a scholarly discussion of the con-
cept in the Iliad must carefully specify which word and meaning is under 
consideration so that readers may adjust their understanding accordingly. 
Givens forthrightly avers doing the philological work necessary to satisfy 
strict evidentiary demands.5
Professor Givens rightly notes that the concept of soul is “possessed of 
a long, complex history of meanings.” He follows by clarifying that he “will 
use the terms soul and spirit interchangeably unless the original or pres-
ent context requires differentiation” (328). Given the shifting ideas among 
the writers surveyed, contextual differentiation is required more often. For 
example, Augustine’s concept of soul changes over time and differs signifi-
cantly from Philo’s concept of soul. Eliding these fundamental distinctions 
can potentially distort the understanding of their views. A broad definition 
of soul may also impede the author’s purpose to establish the explana-
tory power of premortality. Can the concept have great explanatory power 
while tolerating the possible metaphysical varieties of preexistent souls? 
For  example, it follows that the concept of a preexistent soul with moral 
intelligence has more explanatory power than a preexistent soul that does 
not. Least potent of the concepts would be a preexistent soul composed of 
some sort of inert metaphysical stuff out of which God forms souls before 
injecting them into bodies.
Another illustration of philological importance appears in the mat-
ter of translating ancient Hebrew words into Greek. In Psalm 16:10, the 
Hebrew word nephesh seems to refer to the entirety of a person’s life. “Thou 
wilt not leave my life (nephesh) in Sheol.” In the Septuagint, nephesh is 
5. One notes for example, a number of fundamental grammatical errors in 
the discussions of Greek thought. The plural of eidos, meaning “form” or “essence,” 
is eidê, not eidoi (72, 104). The concept of “becoming like God” should read as 
homoiosis theo¯i, not homoiosis theoi (37). 
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translated into the Greek word for soul, psyche. By the second century BC, 
those Greeks influenced by Platonism assumed that the psyche survives 
death. Thus the phrase “thou wilt not leave my soul in Sheol” acquires a dif-
ferent theological dimension—that an immortal soul will be rescued—that 
is absent in the Hebrew.6
The Sadducees justified their denial of the resurrection, even into the 
first century AD, by noting that the Penteteuch nowhere teaches resurrec-
tion or even immortality. No text in the Hebrew Bible clearly asserts the 
immortality of the soul or its continued life after the death until much later 
in Daniel 12. These concepts often were read back into earlier books of the 
Hebrew Bible, particulary after Alexander the Great conquered the Near 
East and began the Hellenization of Hebrew culture.7 Givens himself notes 
the indispensability of care in translation to avoid progressive excision—
removing objectionable ideas by mistranslation (15). But, as Givens knows, 
one must also avoid progressive insertion—importing by mistranslation, 
because one finds them compelling, ideas clearly not in the original passage. 
Of course, Givens’s survey intentionally includes influential readers who 
import the premortality of the soul into texts as well as those who would 
excise the concept. However, it is not always obvious that Givens observes 
the distinction between the sense of the original text and later interpreters.
Finally, I would have been delighted with some theological and philo-
sophical explications of premortality’s explanatory power with respect to 
the problems of innocent suffering and the many difficulties of human exis-
tence. To illustrate, in Numbers 31, the Israelites are commanded by God to 
slay every Midianite man and woman. “Keep alive for yourselves,” says the 
Lord, only those women who “have not known a man by lying with him” 
(verse 18). The text taken as literally true presents the reader with an appar-
ently insurmountable series of perplexities. In searching for a solution, one 
might affirm some version of the concept of a preexistent soul. Now sup-
pose that preexistent soul has moral autonomy and foresight and agrees 
to enter into mortal life as a Midianite. Does a former agreement to suffer 
genocide effectively explain God’s justice or assuage those who see geno-
cide as evil? Ought a preexistent soul to make such an agreement? How 
can the concept of a preexistence console the surviving Midianite virgins? 
6. For many more examples of this phenomenon, see the helpful surveys of 
N. T. Wright, in The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 
chapter 4, and The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
2003), chapter 6, upon which this discussion relies. 
7. N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God. Of course, to say that a text 
does not exemplify an idea, is not to say that the author did not believe the idea. The 
claim made here is textual only. 
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Doesn’t the concept of premortality intensify the guilt of perpetrators? Can 
the explanatory power of a prexistence paradigm resolve such problems?
Historically, Christian theologians and philosophers have not seen how 
to resolve these issues and have at the same time put forward compelling 
arguments for doubting the preexistence of souls. In faulting Augustine for 
following these doubts, does Givens think there are dispositive rebuttals? 
Can the presence of self-sustaining eternal beings that are coequal with 
God (at least in respect to necessary, noncontingent existence) be convinc-
ingly explained? Can Givens calm the doubts of suspicious Christian theo-
logians? Asking for such an argument is a substantial demand, but Givens 
whets the readers’ appetite by asserting the concept’s explanatory power.
When Souls Had Wings is something of an impressionistic work, the 
story of an idea through millennia. Insofar as is it does not intend to dem-
onstrate systematically the explanatory power of an idea, it should not be 
considered a formal philosophical exploration using the precision of spe-
cialized scholarly analysis. Nevertheless, readers sympathetic to the broad 
cluster of ideas regarding preexistence will find the reading illuminating 
and engaging.
Terryl L. Givens’s Response to James L. Siebach
I appreciate the questions Professor Siebach has raised, and I appreciate 
his belief that I have “whet[ted] the readers’ appetite.” I think the principal 
issue he raises has to do with audience and the writer’s purposes. Mormon 
scholars often negotiate a narrow channel between Scylla and Charybdis. 
On the one hand is the danger of injecting Mormon presuppositions into 
an academic discussion. On the other is the contrary danger, that in shying 
away from Scylla we careen on the rocks of Charybdis. In our zeal to protect 
against provincial assumptions and cultural insularity, we see them where 
they do not exist. We think a Mormon’s use of Jeremiah or Job will surely 
be apologetic, or, as in the case of Siebach, we suspect that a book on pre-
existence written by a Mormon is going to be an argument for preexistence.
Siebach says that my book “will be well received by those persons who 
share [my] metaphysical commitments.” I would respond that my meta-
physical commitments are beside the point. Not a single non-Mormon 
reviewer of the text has presumed to know what those metaphysical com-
mitments are or felt they were in any way relevant to the book’s thesis. My 
point is not that I believe the preexistence resolves theological dilemmas, 
but that it was employed by myriad theologians because they felt it did.
Let’s take the soul’s origin as a case in point. In the early Christian 
church and to this day, three theological positions explain the soul’s origin. 
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Creationism is the Catholic view that God creates the soul at the moment 
of conception, quickening, or birth. Traducianism is the Lutheran position 
that parents create the soul at the moment of procreation. Mormons alone 
persist in believing the soul has an eternal, indeterminate origin before 
birth.  Siebach has taken me as criticizing both non-Mormon positions as 
“fraught with metaphysical and moral problems.” Perhaps they are, but I did 
not intend (or need) to use Mormon theology to show it. This book is not 
an apologetics of preexistence any more than Arthur Lovejoy’s Great Chain 
of Being is an apologetics of the great chain of being. Lovejoy’s metaphysi-
cal commitments were irrelevant to his appreciation for how powerful that 
paradigm was for two thousand years of cultural history. It would be inap-
propriate to challenge him on how his concept of the chain of being would 
explain the English Civil War, because he was tracing the history of the way 
that idea was employed, how it changed through time, and how and why it 
self-destructed in the eighteenth century.
In my case, I am tracing a wonderfully rich and contentious history of 
debate and controversy over the soul’s origin. I quote Tertullian, an early 
defender of Traducianism, as saying it has the merit of explaining the con-
veyance of original sin logically and simply. If original sin resided in Adam, 
and original sin is a spiritual condition, then Adam could have reasonably 
passed it on to his posterity the same way he passed on his dimple or his 
brown hair, “assuming that he literally fathered the spirits as well as the 
bodies of his children.” That is Tertullian’s defense of its merits, not mine.
By the same token, I haven’t any idea if my spirit is innately capable of 
creating a baby spirit, but I do trace how the Cambridge Platonists denied 
that capacity. At the same time, they believed that God would be complicit 
in rape if he effectively sanctioned conception by creating a spirit to make 
such an act fruitful. I am not sure if I find their arguments persuasive or not, 
but I do know their frequent appearance in the literature of the Cambridge 
Platonists explains one reason why the Cambridge Platonists rejected both 
Traducianism and Creationism, turning to the only alternative they saw, 
which was preexistence.
One should not assume that because I am LDS, I must be writing with 
the intention of mustering arguments on behalf of an LDS theology. If that 
were indeed the case, I would have failed entirely. For in the entire history 
of the idea of a premortal soul, virtually no version matches Joseph Smith’s 
conception or shows evidence of having influenced his own.
I will conclude with a response to one more comment by Professor 
Siebach. He says, “I would have been delighted with some theological and 
philosophical explications of premortality’s explanatory power with respect 
to the problems of innocent suffering and the many difficulties of human 
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existence.” Let me give just one of many examples where I have done that. 
In Book X of the Republic, Plato tells the story of Er, a kind of guide to spir-
its about to enter mortality. In this account, spirits are given a choice of the 
lives they will lead: royal or impoverished, crippled or sound, beautiful or 
ugly. However, they are admonished to choose carefully, being reminded 
that the purpose of life is the acquisition of virtue. They should consider 
“a life worse if it leads the soul to become more unjust, a better if it leads 
the soul to become more just.” As a consequence, Plato emphasizes, “The 
responsibility [for the conditions of life entered into] lies with the one who 
makes the choice; the god has none” (32).
For those who accept such mythology, there is tremendous power to 
address exactly what Professor Siebach calls for: an example of the idea’s 
explanatory power, from a philosophical and theological point of view, not 
only with respect to the problem of innocent suffering, but with respect to 
the “many difficulties of human existence.” For Plato and those under his 
influence, this conception of preexistence was powerful theodicy.
•
Review by Dana M. Pike— 
Ancient Near Eastern Traditions
Oxford University Press recently published When Souls Had Wings: Pre-
mortal Existence in Western Thought, by Terryl L. Givens, professor of liter-
ature and religion at the University of Richmond in Virginia. Givens wrote 
this book for an educated but general audience, focusing on the intellectual 
history of premortal existence as it survives in documents over the past 
2,400 years of Western thought.
Givens claims in his introduction that the idea of preexistence “appears 
to have more than one point of origin, and influence and inheritance are in 
any case notoriously difficult to establish with certainty where the history 
of ideas is concerned” (4). Chapter 1, titled “Ancient Near Eastern Tradi-
tions,” is thus exploratory in nature. Givens sees a number of elements in 
ancient Near Eastern texts, including the Hebrew Bible, which, when taken 
together, eventually mix into a sort of theological stew, contributing to 
the development of the concept that humans were once premortal spirits. 
 Givens rightly indicates, however, that there is no passage in any ancient 
Near Eastern text, including the Hebrew Bible, that explicitly communi-
cates the premortal existence of all humans.
Accordingly, this chapter presents a variety of ancient Near Eastern 
texts that provide potential leads and “intimations” (9) for the development 
of the idea of preexistent human spirits. Cited passages in Mesopotamian 
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texts and in the Hebrew Bible relate to four broad areas: Mesopotamian 
creation myths, divine assemblies, divine election, and what Givens terms 
“populous heavens” (16), the belief that a host of beings populated that 
realm. Givens is wise to focus on texts dealing with these four topics, for 
any hints of preexistence found in the ancient Near Eastern texts will most 
likely occur in relation to these areas.
However, chapter 1 would have been even stronger, I believe, if it had 
included a brief statement of methodology explaining why some passages 
are included and others not. Along with Mesopotamian and Israelite texts, 
Givens might also have cited Egyptian or Hittite texts in his discussion, 
which are also part of the ancient Near Eastern literary tradition.
Questions about methodology also arise when Givens uses the writ-
ings of Origen to help explain the meaning of a verse in Deuteronomy (15). 
 Origen, a Christian author who wrote in the first half of the third century AD, 
accepted the premortal existence of human souls; but using Origen’s views 
to support the inclusion of Deuteronomy 32:8 in a chapter on ancient Near 
Eastern traditions may be construed as a form of eisegesis. Origen’s views 
would more naturally be included in a chapter on early Christian thought. 
Conversely, Givens makes no mention in his first chapter of Proverbs 8, in 
which Wisdom personified claims to have been created by God before the 
creation of the earth, but he does include this passage in his third chapter 
when discussing later apocryphal texts in the biblical tradition.
Givens, whose expertise is in texts of more recent centuries, is generally 
dependent upon the work of other scholars in preparing the early chapters 
dealing with ancient traditions. This is not to imply that he is largely mis-
guided in his choice of texts or in his assessment of them; he is not. Deal-
ing with textual material from so many centuries and cultures would be a 
daunting challenge for any author. The fact that Givens does so well in this 
endeavor is a tribute to his extensive research and his intellectual abilities.
The exploratory nature of Chapter 1 will likely elicit some questions and 
quibbles among scholars about the passages he includes as evidence of early 
foreshadowings of the concept of preexistence. What, after all, constitutes 
these “intimations that the soul is traceable to a pre-mortal existence?” (9). 
To illustrate the challenge of such an undertaking, I will evaluate four texts 
that Givens provides as intimations of preexistence.
First, in his discussion on divine election, Givens highlights the pro-
logue to Hammurabi’s law collection, dated to about 1755 BC, which relates 
how “in the distant past” the god Marduk was granted powers, and Hammu-
rabi was chosen before he was born to be the great king of Babylon. Givens 
rightly observes that the apparent purpose of this passage is “to endow Ham-
murabi with authority and prestige, . . . not to propound an anthropology of 
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the human soul” (13–14). This is the only Mesopotamian text of which I am 
aware claiming the divine election of a human before the person’s birth. This 
passage does qualify as a hint or foreshadowing of preexistence.
Second, Givens cites Jeremiah 1:5: “Before I formed you in the womb I 
knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed you a 
prophet to the nations” (14). This verse unambiguously claims that Yahweh 
“knew” Jeremiah even before his conception, although what that implies is 
not clear in the Old Testament itself. Functionally similar to the Hammurabi 
text, this passage is most often interpreted as part of a report designed to 
imbue Jeremiah with greater authority. No one of whom I am aware, other 
than Mormons, currently understands this verse as support for the personal 
preexistence of Jeremiah. Most people dismiss the words in Jeremiah 1:5 as 
figurative. However, I believe this passage is an obvious choice for inclusion 
in Givens’s quest for early intimations of the idea of preexistence.
Third, Givens discusses Psalm 139:15: “My frame [‘otsem/“bone, skele-
ton”] was not hidden from you when I was being made in secret, intricately 
woven in the depths of the earth.” This passage, “while not as clear in its lan-
guage, similarly suggests a pre-mortal origin to humans.” Givens correctly 
observes that the Hebrew word ’eretz, “earth,” does, in conjunction with 
Akkadian and Ugaritic cognates, sometimes designate the “underworld” in 
addition to commonly referring to the earth itself (see Ex. 15:12; Jonah 2:6). 
“Psalm 139 therefore evinces the belief that the human soul was created in 
a different, under- or otherworldly sphere to which it will someday return” 
(14). I fail to see a demonstrable reference in Psalm 139 to the “otherworldly” 
existence of spirit or soul, nor a reference to a soul returning to that world.8 
Modern commentators generally understand the whole pericope of Psalm 
139:13–18 as a metaphoric comparison between a mother’s womb, specifi-
cally mentioned in verse 13, and the depths of the earth (with the powers 
of creation and judgment ascribed to Yahweh). Job 1:21 is often cited as a 
conceptual parallel to Psalm 139:13–18: “[Job] said, ‘Naked I came from my 
mother’s womb, and naked shall I return there’” (NRSV). True, a few com-
mentators have theorized that earlier mythological remnants lurk behind 
the present form of these poetic lines in Psalms;9 but with no solid textual 
8. Surprisingly, Givens does not quote Robert Moore, who claimed that Psalm 
139:15 suggests the concept of preexistence. Moore notes that some authors have 
used Psalm 139:15 to support preexistence in the underworld, but Moore provides 
no citation to document his claim. Robert Moore, “Pre-existence,” in The Encyclo-
pedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings, 12 vols. (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 
1924), 10:238.
9. See, for example, Hans-Joachim Kraus, Psalms 60–150, A Commentary, trans. 
Hilton C. Oswald (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1989), 516–17.
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support, such arguments remain speculative. Givens’s purposes might have 
been better served by quoting the next verse as an intimation of preexis-
tence: “Your [Yahweh’s] eyes beheld my unformed substance. In your book 
were written all the days that were formed for me, when none of them as yet 
existed” (Psalm 139:16, NRSV).
Fourth, Givens refers to the portion of the Atrahasis Epic that relates 
the creation of the first human. This epic is attested from about 1700 BC, the 
late Old Babylonian period. In it, the god Enki commanded that a mixture 
be made of clay and the “flesh and blood” of a lesser god to be slain for the 
purpose of creating humans. Enki further instructed: “Let there be a spirit 
[etemmu] from the god’s flesh. Let it proclaim living [man] as its sign. So 
that this be not forgotten, let there be a spirit [etemmu]” (10). In his discus-
sion of this text, Givens cites Tzvi Abusch, who states that the divine killing 
of the lesser god provided the “soul that imbues the individual [human] 
with life and consciousness” (11). I hold a different view than Givens and 
Abusch (and Jean Bottéro, whom  Givens also cites). Contrary to the claim 
of Abusch, the slain god’s spirit is never mixed into the substances used to 
create the first human. It is only said to continue as a “sign” of how people 
first came about. Certainly, the Atrahasis account indicates that human 
creation involved divine as well as earthly “stuff,”10 but I do not see any 
indication that provides, as Givens claims, “a window into the emergence 
of the idea of the human soul, its genesis in the heavens, and its ambiguous 
status in the universe” (9–10).
These four examples illustrate the challenge of determining which 
texts do, or do not, contain “intimations” of the idea of human preexis-
tence. Whatever one thinks of any particular text, Givens’s book is stronger 
because this chapter on ancient Near Eastern traditions is included in it. His 
point is valid that there were ancient Semitic conceptions that foreshadow 
the idea of preexistence, that this idea was not just a Greek phenomenon 
that impacted Judeo-Christian texts. I also appreciate that Givens ventured 
beyond the Hebrew Bible by referencing Mesopotamian and Ugaritic texts. 
I commend him for finding in ancient Near Eastern texts some stirrings of 
premortal existence, rather than just beginning with later Greek and Jewish 
claims that date from the last few centuries BC and in which the notion of 
preexistence is clearly stated, albeit in a variety of forms.
10. Although different in details, divine and earthly “stuff” are likewise com-
bined in the creation of the first human according to Genesis 2:7: “Then the LORD 
God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the 
breath of life” (NRSV).
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It will be helpful for readers to think about how and why and where, 
from a historical point of view, the idea of preexistence got started. Chap-
ter 1 serves as an important preface to Givens’s grand overview of a fascinat-
ing topic. I recommend this book.
Terryl L. Givens’s Response to Dana M. Pike
I appreciate Dana M. Pike’s review and want to respond both generally 
and specifically. The general problem Pike raises concerning methodol-
ogy relates to the hazards of cross-disciplinary studies. The contemporary 
impetus for cross-disciplinary research is evidence of a far-reaching recog-
nition that we as a body of scholars have overspecialized ourselves to death, 
to the detriment of broader perspectives. The discipline of intellectual his-
tory often strives to see the grand sweep of an idea across time and culture. 
Intellectual history of this kind relies upon a certain amount of  generosity 
and forbearance from specialists, as well as their willingness to accept intel-
lectual interlopers in good faith and without fear of colonization.
For this reason, I am only too willing to recognize the limitations of my 
own expertise. In a work that encompasses traditions from Mesopotamia, 
Ugarit, Palestine, Greece, Italy, Ancient Rome, England, Germany, Poland, 
Russia, France, Spain, and America, it should be clear that I often relied on 
the scholarship of others in my work. The question such cross-disciplinary 
endeavors invite is twofold: Are there any advantages to be gained by such 
ambitious attempts, and is the academic community supportive enough of 
these grand forays to make them feasible?
Claude Lévi-Strauss was an anthropologist, but when he brought his 
own disciplinary training to the study of mythic literature, he detected 
patterns and ways of constructing meaning that played a key role in the 
development of a new critical school of theory called structuralism, which 
had tremendous impact on a discipline not his own. Sometimes, a fresh 
perspective can prompt useful discoveries and connections. Professor Pike 
once told me there were no preexistent motifs in Babylonian literature. 
Later, I came upon the Atrahasis creation narrative. Judging by his review, 
Pike now acknowledges this passage as at least relevent to the discussion; 
perhaps my trespass into his discipline has borne some fruit. True, Pike 
has expressed doubts before about the significance of the Atrahasis nar-
rative, wondering if the passage conveys belief or just inventive creative 
effort. However, I trace the employment of preexistence as a motif that does 
important work of many kinds: aesthetic, cultural, psychological, theologi-
cal—and creative. Whether Mesopotamian references to a preexistent soul 
were taken literally by the populace is immaterial to my case.
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I think it is also important that, when evaluating work from a “general-
ist” disciplinary orientation, scholars don’t always presume that a specific 
and tightly confined “specialist” methodology is useful for all purposes. 
Pike wonders about my methodology when I cite Origen, a third-century 
Christian, in my chapter on ancient Near Eastern traditions. I would find 
this methodologically problematic only if my interest were confined to 
some kind of historically circumscribed philological examination of a bib-
lical text. Tracing certain textual motifs and interpretations through four 
millennia of readings, misreadings, borrowings, and adaptations is the 
essence of intellectual history. The accuracy (and century) of Origen’s read-
ing may be germane to Pike’s field of Old Testament studies, but it is not as 
relevant to the kind of intellectual history Wings sets out to be.
Professor Pike also disputes my reading of particular biblical passages. 
For example, he challenges my interpretation of Psalm 139:15 as having ref-
erence to some kind of preexistent creation. While my reading may not be 
the dominant interpretation among experts in the book of Psalms, yet Pike 
acknowledges that a few authors do agree with me, so I am therefore not 
unique in making the connection. I also welcome his constructive addition 
of Psalm 139:16 to the discussion.
Professor Pike points out that only Mormons use Jeremiah 1:5 to sug-
gest personal preexistence. Certainly, being Mormon doesn’t make a read-
ing right, but it shouldn’t make it suspect, either. And to clarify, When Souls 
Had Wings is not so concerned with Mormon interpretations. On page 14 
of the book, I point out that “this passage could merely suggest foreknowl-
edge,” and I repeat subsequently that most biblical allusions to preexistence 
are plausibly read as referring to God’s foreknowledge, not personal pre-
existence. Certainly there is a danger that a Mormon would read Mormon 
theological presuppositions into the text, and Pike is wise to point this pos-
sibility out to BYU Studies readers. Interestingly, non-Mormon reviewers 
thus far have not noted any such presuppositions.
Surely there are areas where my readings could have benefitted more 
from Pike’s important work in the Old Testament. Although I was not suc-
cessful in my attempt to connect with Pike, I was able to have six other schol-
ars with expertise in the literature and languages of Mesopotamia review this 
chapter, in addition to other scholars in Hebrew studies. Of course, no one 
of them is responsible for what errors may remain, but all made significant 
contributions in reviewing and contributing to the chapter. Though Pike 
and others may disagree with the readings of Bottéro and Abusch, there are 
trained scholars today who support me in citing these readings.
In conclusion, my general plea is that we as writers and scholars, in 
order to contribute to a common enterprise of greater understanding of the 
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past, look for opportunities to make our various disciplines mutually sup-
portive, realizing that we are often asking different kinds of questions and 
using different methodologies. I hope that this exchange has moved in the 
direction of facilitating that kind of greater understanding.
•
Review by Jesse D. Hurlbut— 
Middle Ages
In his latest book, Terryl L. Givens undertakes the fascinating project of 
surveying historical attitudes and teachings regarding the premortal exis-
tence of the soul. Limiting his review to the Western tradition, he also 
demonstrates the inextricable associations of this fairly narrow topic to 
such broad concepts as the nature of human existence, the purpose of life, 
and even the attributes of God. The author admirably maintains academic 
distance and objectivity throughout the book. Nevertheless, LDS readers 
especially may find their interest piqued (and their objectivity challenged) 
by numerous indications that what they sometimes hold as proprietary to 
LDS belief has recurred in the writings of philosophers and theologians 
throughout the ages.
Givens’s treatment of the Middle Ages is almost completely limited to 
the theological positions established in the fourth and fifth centuries, and 
which then stood essentially unrefuted for most of the next thousand years. 
Givens’s thorough investigation into the Platonic and Neoplatonic anteced-
ents prepares the way for him to present the decisive role of Augustine in 
establishing orthodoxy on the question of premortality. The book points 
out, however, that even Augustine approached this question with only the 
greatest hesitation. After reciting the possible views on the origin of the soul, 
the Bishop of Hippo commented: “It would be rash to affirm any of these. 
For the Catholic commentators on Scripture have not solved or shed light 
on this obscure and perplexing question” (109). Augustine’s early writings 
seemed to favor the idea of a premortal soul, and he may have been content 
to leave the question unanswered for lack of sufficient insight, had it not 
been for the controversial ideas of the British monk Pelagius.
Givens presents a clear account of how the greater question of whether 
salvation comes by grace or by free will forced Augustine to take a position 
against the preexistent soul. The extreme view of Pelagius that free will 
alone sufficed to lead mankind to salvation undermined the role of Christ 
and his grace. “It is not that Pelagius promoted the particular unorthodoxy 
of preexistence,” writes Givens, “but that . . . an emphasis on human preex-
istence comports quite comfortably with a celebration of humanity’s primal 
152 v  BYU Studies
purity, inherited innocence, and divine potential” (175). In order to refute 
these heretical teachings, Augustine argued to the opposite extreme in favor 
of grace and against premortality. Givens carefully teases the subtle inter-
woven arguments out of the historical record, thus revealing how an uncer-
tain concept becomes doctrine as the unintended casualty of a struggle for 
orthodoxy in weightier matters.
In the chapter entitled “Middle Ages to the Renaissance,” Givens seems 
content to accept the Augustinian position as the dominant theological 
stance. He briefly cites a number of authors who contribute nuanced argu-
ments to the discussion in later centuries, including Peter Lombard, Thomas 
Aquinas, Hildegard von Bingen, and Julian of Norwich. The strength of this 
chapter, however, is in the discussion of the Jewish teachings from the 
(premedieval) Mishnah and Midrashim, and the ensuing Kabbalistic texts 
appearing in the thirteenth century. Givens then skips to the seventeenth-
century writings of the Lutheran mystic Jacob Boehme.
Even though Givens discusses the role of angels in the Creation as well 
as in relation to the soul in both the Christian and the Jewish traditions 
(notably, in Pseudo-Dionysius and in the Zohar), he foregoes the oppor-
tunity to discuss the war in heaven and the fall of Lucifer and the rebel 
angels—a theme that frequently appeared in late-medieval art and drama. 
Even though some treatment of the subject appears in his later discussion 
of Milton, this chapter would have been the appropriate place to establish 
the roots for this tradition. Because of the breadth and extent of his project, 
Givens is certainly entitled to editorial omissions, but since he frequently 
opens the door to nontheological teachings and even folk traditions, leaving 
out the deep-rooted cultural artifacts of Saint Michael slaying the dragon 
and even the dramatic allegorical debates of Justice and Mercy that precede 
the Creation seems more like a lacuna.11
Notwithstanding the limitations of his treatment of the later Middle 
Ages and the early Reformation period, Givens has produced an impressive 
volume. The detailed examination of classical and early Christian writings 
11. In addition to the countless depictions in painting and sculpture of Saint 
Michael slaying a dragon or a devil, there are a number of representations of the 
fall of the rebel angels. See, for example, folio 64v in the Très riches heures du duc 
de Berry. Several late medieval passion plays represented the history of the world 
from Creation to Apocalypse in a series of plays that took several days to perform. 
Frequently, a short prologue featured a debate between the allegorical characters 
of Justice, Mercy, Truth, Peace, and Wisdom. God the Father supervises the debate, 
and a plan that meets the needs of each party is devised in which Christ is sent as 
a savior for mankind. Arnould Gréban, Mystère de la Passion, ed. Gaston Paris and 
Gaston Raynaud (Paris: F. Vieweg, 1878), 3–8.
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on the origins of the soul provides the necessary foundation for under-
standing how Augustine and others finally took the dogmatic stance that 
they did. This understanding constitutes the springboard for comprehend-
ing later intellectual and theological developments.
Terryl L. Givens’s Response to Jesse D. Hurlbut
A continuing challenge in writing this book was the selection of what was 
relevant. First in priority were actual discussions or illustrations of a human 
premortal existence. Second were treatments that directly influenced or 
grounded subsequent developments. Hurlbut and others may wonder why 
I include the epic describing the war in heaven by John Milton but not 
those accounts and traditions from the Middle Ages. After all, Milton him-
self does not represent the war in heaven as directly involving human par-
ticipants. Unlike other versions of a heaven populated by numerous and 
at times hard-to-situate beings, Milton’s treatment is generally straightfor-
ward: God, Satan, and angels fill the pre-earth realms. I include him, none-
theless, because a number of imitators, some self-acknowledged, modify 
his representations to include human participants. Some believed that Mil-
ton’s poetry was good but his history was not, insofar as there actually was 
human involvement in the events he described.
Abel Evans, for example, published Pre-Existence: A Poem, in Imitation of 
Milton. In it, Evans retells the story of the war in heaven but turns the rebel-
lious angels into premortal humans. As I describe in my book (178–80), “in 
imitation” turns out to be more a matter of “in correction.” The poem depicts 
a scene in heaven after the defeat of the rebellious angels and their dispatch to 
hell. Not all dissenters, in this version, meet the fate of the eternally damned. 
For upon returning to heaven, the victorious hosts find there a suppliant 
throng of repentant rebels, “troops less stubborn, less involv’d / In crime and 
ruin.” These plead so persuasively for clemency that God softens. Eventually, 
he decrees, they may again “emerge to light,” but only after a penance described 
in terms so harsh as to certainly deter any future rebellion. They shall expiate 
their crimes upon “a dusty ball” even then taking shape—the earth.
But like the ancient writer Basilides, Evans believes that God in his mercy 
caused us to forget our origin as rebellious angels. (Remember that Dante said 
the greatest torment was to remember bliss in the midst of present pain.) So 
God imposes by way of preparation for their descent, long draughts of the river 
Lethe. The resultant human condition is one that dulls the shock of such a 
cataclysmic decline in fortune but at the same time torments the soul, Tantalus-
like, with reason and memory alike that feed but cannot satisfy an inarticulate 
longing for home. The beauty of Evans’s re-creation of premortality is that it 
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explains the pain of the human condition, God’s justice in our suffering, and 
our inarticulate sense of loss as we make our way on earth.
A century after Milton, a would-be historian of Masonry takes a similar 
position. Laurence Dermott describes a project he undertook to go beyond 
conventional histories of his brotherhood, in order “to trace Masonry not 
only to Adam in his sylvan Lodge in Paradise, but to give some Account 
of the Craft even before the Creation.” In other words, he is going to trace 
the origins of Masonry to its foundations in premortality. He completed 
a volume in which he describes what he refers to euphemistically as the 
heavenly “transactions of the first Grand Lodge, particularly the excluding 
of the unruly Members.” That story, he notes, was already recounted by 
Milton in Paradise Lost.12
It seems to me that if I had chosen to extend Milton’s genealogy back-
ward, by discussing medieval versions of the war in heaven, that would 
have only been relevant to my topic at two generations removed. As for Pro-
fessor Hurlbut’s comments on Augustine and subsequent medieval ortho-
doxy, I think he is exactly right. Augustine is the hinge on which the entire 
history of preexistence turns. That preexistence persisted so pervasively as 
a motif, in spite of the eventual opposition by Christianity’s most influential 
theologian, is proof of the idea’s immense and almost irresistible appeal.
•
Review by David B. Paxman— 
Romantics, Transcendentalists, and the Modern Age
Terryl L. Givens is one of the most respected Latter-day Saint scholars 
and one of the most successful in publishing with a top-tier press, having 
published previously The Viper on the Hearth (1997), By the Hand of Mor-
mon (2003), and People of Paradox (2007) with Oxford University Press. In 
When Souls Had Wings, he addresses a doctrine that often separates LDS 
from orthodox Christian belief. Before reading, I had not grasped how 
heretical most Christian traditions now consider the proposition that we 
had individual existence as spirits before this life. Givens succeeds in dem-
onstrating that (1) the concept of premortal existence has a history as old as 
Western thought, both in theology and secular philosophy; (2) early Chris-
tian theologians had declared the concept heretical; and (3) in spite of its 
supposed heretical status, the concept has persisted into the twentieth (and 
12. Laurence Dermott, Ahiman Rezon, or A Help to a Brother; Shewing the 
Excellency of Secrecy and the First Cause or Motive of the Institution of Free-Masonry 
(London: Laurence Dermott, 1756), v.
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twenty-first) century because it offers such powerful advantages in explain-
ing the nature of the human soul and God’s justice in placing people in such 
radically different, and sometimes miserable, circumstances on earth.
In advancing these lines of thought, Givens is aware of the paradox of ori-
gins: by tracing back to early expressions of preexistence and to the ultimate 
origins of the human soul, many more foundational questions arise, such as 
what came before human premortality and what caused the whole preexis-
tent state of affairs to come about in the first place? Still, the book effectively 
challenges the rest of Christianity, if not philosophers, to rethink their oppo-
sition to this important account of our state of being before mortality.
My review will concentrate on the chapters that cover from the late 
seventeenth century through the twentieth century. Here, as in earlier sec-
tions, the book demonstrates that religious thinkers opposed preexistence 
not because they had scriptural evidence against it, but because it did not 
square with creedal orthodoxy concerning God’s eternality and omnipo-
tence: “To posit preexistent souls can be construed as an affront to God 
alone as eternal and a diminishing of the distance that separates Creator 
from created” (285). Proponents insisted that the injustices of mortal life 
were standing challenges to belief in God’s justice, a problem that was 
resolved if we lived in a prior state in which we made choices that affected 
conditions in our earthly existence, or if in that state we assented to come 
to earth under any circumstances. Secular philosophers in the modern 
era had their own qualms about directly postulating preexistence. They 
employed its conceptual advantages while exploring problems of knowl-
edge and identity, but they often hedged and placed the idea of preexistence 
in the abstract lest they appear to follow Plato, rely on religion for solutions 
to philosophical issues, or assert what could not be demonstrated.
The chapter entitled “The Cartesian Aftermath” explores a century in 
which primarily a philosophical exploration rather than a religious inquiry 
kept the concept of premortality alive. René Descartes posited that some 
ideas, those that seemed to be innate, could not be accounted for by exter-
nal sources or by the mind’s making them. While John Locke attacked 
such a proposition, his contemporary Gottfried Leibniz also made innate 
ideas central to his philosophy. Givens is especially adept at noting the 
“double-speak” of these philosophers, who invoked various concepts of 
preexistence without overtly affirming them. Leibniz walked a tightrope, 
eschewing the Platonic realm of the soul and the religious pre-earth life 
as well, yet postulating a conceptual preexistence. Thus one scholar called 
his preexistence “the centerpiece of his metaphysics” (196), even though 
Leibniz embeds the concept in some curious and imaginative postulations. 
Among these is the idea of monads—self-existing, self-defining entities 
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that exist eternally, exist solely in themselves, but also exist fully in their 
relations to all other monads.
Givens devotes two chapters to the nineteenth century, one on “Phi-
losophy and Theology, 1800–1900,” and the other on “Romanticism and 
Transcendentalism, 1800–1900.” In the first, Joseph Smith appears as “one 
of the few Christian thinkers to develop notions of preexistence that do not 
derive from or rely upon the standard Platonic precedents” (216). Among 
the notable features of Smith’s teachings are that premortal spirits were 
essentially innocent rather than inherently corrupt, that intelligences pre-
ceded even the premortal existence of humans as spirits, that pre-earth life 
featured some form of familial organization, and that the spirit has material 
properties, though finer than earthly physicality. Givens notes the poten-
tial redundancy of this last formulation: if spirit is matter, then why the 
need for the physical? “Exactly what purpose is served by sheathing a pure 
form of matter in an impure form is never explained in Mormon doctrine” 
(218).  Givens does not emphasize Joseph Smith over other figures—a tacti-
cal choice, I suspect, made to avoid a book with an LDS partisan feel. Still, 
readers might well have appreciated a discussion on how Smith and other 
Latter-day Saints resolved the problems of divine justice that nonortho-
dox theologians escaped by positing a fall and evil choices in the premortal 
realm, or how (and if) the spiritual creation of all things in Moses 3 differs 
from the creation of our spirits.
Further along in the chapter, Smith can be contrasted with his contem-
porary Edward Beecher, whose Conflict of the Ages comprises the “last fully 
sustained effort to win theological legitimacy for pre-mortal existence in 
the American tradition” (231). Beecher, a prominent Boston minister and 
son of a famous orthodox Protestant family, was convinced that “almost 
two millennia of efforts to reconcile faith and fairness, dogma and intel-
lect” had failed to settle the debate over how a just God could create a race 
of depraved sinners and hold them accountable before him (223). Beecher 
thought he had discovered the missing piece: before this life, human spirits 
were created and given freedom and opportunity. Many failed in that state 
of existence, and those spirits went to earth for a second chance. Thus, 
mortal life on earth, this “vast moral hospital,” offers another opportunity 
to master the self and choose truth. Beecher’s theology is part of a mosaic of 
the decline of Calvinism in nineteenth-century American religion.
The other prominent advocate in this chapter is the German Julius 
Müller, who was led to believe in a preexistent state by the problem of sin 
and how to account for it. Premortal existence appeared to Müller as “a 
paradigm with compelling power to solve the dilemma of free will and also 
to explain those aspects of the human condition that fall under the domain 
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of otherwise indecipherable intuitions and sentiments” (235). In his theol-
ogy, spirits and, by extension, humans cannot be held accountable unless 
they are given a moment of free choice where alternatives are equally bal-
anced—and in that moment choose evil still.
In the chapter “Romanticism and Transcendentalism,” Givens takes his 
readers through the much-loved poets Blake, Coleridge, and Wordsworth, 
as well as Victorian poets with less overt expressions of preexistence such as 
Tennyson. Most of these poets found preexistence imaginatively and poeti-
cally compelling without overtly affirming a religious dimension to belief 
in the soul and divine creation. The chapter points out that no translation 
of Plato’s complete works existed in English until 1804, so a rediscovery of 
Plato at this time may explain the resurgence of thinkers and poets ponder-
ing on the soul’s endowments. Blake was the “most unabashedly mystical 
and the most unapologetic in his embrace of Platonic preexistence” (243). 
Wordworth’s great “Immortality Ode” is probably the best known and most 
haunting expression of preexistence in poetry. The lines beginning “Our 
birth is but a sleep and a forgetting” have led many readers to construct a 
belief system out of his poetry, though the poet himself resisted expressing 
personal beliefs of this kind. American transcendentalists such as Ralph 
Waldo Emerson and Amos Bronson Alcott, constrained by fewer religious 
inhibitions than theologians, were much more positive in their vision of 
the “heritable component” that human souls brought with them. These 
writers endorsed preexistence because it explained the divine in man and 
supported the expansive versions of human prehistory (263–64).
In “Preexistence in the Modern Age,” Givens lays out several vigor-
ous twentieth-century assertions of preexistence that were made before the 
concept again retreated from orthodox theology and philosophy. Nicholas 
Berdyaev, a prominent Russian philosopher, was perhaps the last to argue for 
it unambiguously and at length. He believed that preexistence was the only 
viable alternative to “the terrorist and servile doctrine of everlasting hell” 
(279). Considered a heresiarch by the Greek Orthodox Church, he nonethe-
less held that “the kind of freedom preexistence makes possible outweighs 
the dangers of traditional constructions of God’s sovereignty” (281). Theoso-
phists such as Madame Helena Blavatsky also kept preexistence alive, but 
with theosophy we move out of mainstream philosophy and religion into 
peripheral religion and art. “As the motif disappeared from religious dis-
course, so did it decline in artistic representation as well” (291). It is found in 
the poets Robert Frost and Wislawa Szymborska (I enthusiastically recom-
mend her poem “A Version of Events”), the dramatist Sam Shepard, the film 
Wings of Desire, as well as in pop culture and parascience, such as in the pre-
birth experiences (BPEs) many mothers have had of prospective children.
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Givens thoroughly succeeds in showing the long history of, and oppo-
sition to, the concept of premortality, its advantages in religious and philo-
sophical contexts, and the orthodox rationale for resisting its adoption. 
LDS readers will learn that a long line of theologians have battled the doc-
trine not so much on its merits—orthodox arguments are “almost invari-
ably logically inferior” to it—but because it clashed with already-adopted 
ideas of God’s eternality (6). From my perspective, Givens clearly intends 
his book as a challenge to orthodox Christian thought. I hope it succeeds 
in drawing theologians of other faiths into thinking again about where we 
come from and how that relates to why we are here.
Terryl L. Givens’s Response to David B. Paxman
I appreciate Paxman’s point that I do not explore the full details and ramifica-
tions of LDS belief in premortality. This was a deliberate decision on my part 
that has surprised and dismayed some readers. To explain, I wanted to situ-
ate Joseph’s teachings on the topic without judgment or special favor. It turns 
out his teachings had striking resonance with some contemporary develop-
ments in German theology but were otherwise almost entirely disconnected 
from a nineteenth-century context. As it has been noted, the early nineteenth 
century was awash with a rediscovery of Platonism, which was the principle 
inspiration for almost every version of preexistence from antiquity to the 
present time. Joseph’s pronouncements, by contrast, occur in a kind of con-
ceptual vacuum, resonant with Semitic precursors but with nothing Platonic.
Even so, if I were to write the chapter on Joseph Smith today, it would 
be very different because two very exciting discoveries occurred several 
months after my book was finished, involving two revelations that were 
originally planned for inclusion in the Doctrine and Covenants but were left 
out. They would not only have given us a different provenance for the Mor-
mon idea of preexistence, but they also would have connected the idea with 
some Platonic and Neoplatonic currents. These documents can be found in 
the revelations and translations series of The Joseph Smith Papers.13 Two of 
them, surprisingly, involve preexistence, though perhaps obliquely.
In March of 1832, Joseph Smith received a sample of pure language 
that gave the name of God as Awman, or “the being which made all things 
in all its parts.” The “children of men,” it went on to say, are “the greatest 
parts of Awman.”14 Now, this phrasing might not by itself suggest anything 
13. The history behind this series of The Joseph Smith Papers is introduced in 
a special feature of BYU Studies 48, no. 3 (2009): 5–91.
14. Robin Scott Jensen, Robert J. Woodford, and Steven C. Harper, eds. Man-
uscript Revelation Books, facsimile edition, Revelations and Translations series 
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to do with a premortal genealogy; however, together with a subsequent 
revelation dated February 27, 1833, the text points quite clearly to a con-
ception of spirits as emanating (that’s a very Neoplatonic concept) from 
God. Little is known of the context in which this second revelation was 
received. An undated broadside of a poetic rendering of the revelation 
indicates it was “sung in tongues by Elder D. W. Patten . . . and interpreted 
by Elder S[idney] Rigdon.” So it has the distinction, I believe, of being the 
only revelation in the revelation book where Joseph Smith played no part, 
which may be why it was later excluded from the Doctrine and Covenants. 
Recorded in the hand of Fredrick G. Williams, it had connection with the 
prophecy of Enoch, which had been recently revealed at the time. In this 
song, Enoch “saw the begining the ending of man he saw the time when 
Adam his father was made and he saw that he was in eternity before a grain 
of dust in the ballance was weighed he saw that he emenated and came 
down from God.”15
The likelihood that the Awman revelation and the Enoch hymn were 
together pivotal in concertizing a Mormon concept of preexistence is sup-
ported by the fact that when W. W. Phelps published in the Church paper 
a poetic celebration of preexistence in 1833, it bore the marks of these two 
sources. Smith unambiguously affirmed the eternal preexistence of human 
spirits in early May 1833 with a revelation Latter-day Saints are familiar 
with: “Man was also in the beginning with God. Intelligence, or the light 
of truth, was not created or made, neither indeed can be” (D&C 93:29). 
Tellingly, Phelps published his poetic declaration based not on that revela-
tion but on the hymn of Enoch: “Before the mountains rais’d their heads, / 
Or the small dust of balance weigh’d. / With God he [Enoch] saw his race 
began / And from him emanated man, / And with him did in glory dwell 
/ Before there was an earth or hell.”16 The importance of the Awman and 
the Enoch texts as founding the first clear understanding of preexistence is 
further evident in the fact that Parley P. Pratt relied on those same two texts, 
invoking the language of the Enoch hymn and the imagery of the Awman 
revelation in his 1838 linkage of theosis and premortality: “The redeemed 
will return to the fountain and become part of the great all from which they 
of The Joseph Smith Papers, ed. Dean C. Jessee, Ronald K. Esplin, and Richard 
Lyman Bushman (Salt Lake City: Church Historian’s Press, 2009), 265; Sample of 
Pure Language, circa March 1832, http://josephsmithpapers.org/paperSummary/
sample-of-pure-language-circa-march-1832.
15. Jensen, Woodford, and Harper, Manuscript Revelation Books, 509.
16. W. W. Phelps, “Age after Age Has Rolled Away,” Evening and the Morning 
Star 1, no. 12 (May 1833), 8.
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emanated.”17 I was unfamiliar with these two revelations at the time I wrote 
Wings, so it does not include them.
Even so, my section on preexistence and Joseph Smith was restrained 
(and would have remained so even with these two revelations) because I 
did not want to create the impression that other treatments in the history 
of that idea were necessarily inferior to or preparatory for Joseph’s defini-
tive treatment. In some ways, his was actually the sparsest of all treatments. 
Unlike his peers, he did not arrive at the idea of preexistence as the solution 
to a problem. It’s as if he knew the answer but wasn’t aware that there was a 
question. He did not invoke the idea of preexistence to make sense of God’s 
justice, spiritual intimations, love at first sight, freedom of the will, or a 
dozen other problems that the idea might have elucidated.
•
Question and Answer Session (Moderated by John W. Welch)
Welch: The mention of these two revelations brings up a question that arose 
as I read the book, which is, How many more of these kinds of texts are 
there—not just from Joseph Smith but in the Western tradition? What 
did you include and what did you exclude? I’d like to know what’s in the 
scrap pile.
Givens: Everything I found is in the book. Everything! There are no scraps 
left (laughter).
Welch: But seriously, are any of you aware of other texts that could have 
been included? Should there be another project in the future? I hope this 
is just the beginning of looking at these texts and finding more sources 
out there.
Givens: There are some German sources not included. There was a real flow-
ering of the idea of preexistence where theology and philosophy inter-
sected in early nineteenth-century Germany. The idea mostly arose with 
the notion of sin from a theological point of view and the notion of free-
dom from a philosophical point of view. And these thinkers were all com-
ing to the same conclusion, as expressed by a contemporary Cambridge 
philosopher named John McTaggart, who said, “Look, it’s common sense! 
If God created the human spirit, then he’s responsible for our sins.”
  The same argument was made by Immanuel Kant; in fact, he clearly 
defends preexistence three times, in three completely different contexts, 
in three separate arguments. One of his contemporaries complained that 
17. Parley P. Pratt, Mormonism Unveiled (New York: 1838), 27.
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Kant was dogmatic about insisting on human preexistence, and yet in 
modern textbooks on German philosophy, you can hardly find even a 
footnote on the idea. Julius Müller wrote a two-volume work on the doc-
trine of sin and said that preexistence is the only possible theological 
foundation upon which God can hold us accountable for our choices. 
There were many more obscure German philosophers writing about pre-
existence, and they are probably the largest single group that fell by the 
wayside.
Welch: So, there is more.
Givens: Yes, there’s more.
Welch: One might also want to read more about the “Hymn of the Pearl,” 
an early Christian text that BYU Studies has published an article about.18 
Also, I was recently in the museum in Lyon, France, looking for Roman 
antiquities. I walked into a room dedicated to Louis Janmot, who was 
a native of Lyon. From 1836 to 1855, he worked on a poem called “The 
Poem of the Soul,” and he also painted a whole series of large murals 
that would fill this room. The first mural is called the Generation of the 
Soul, which depicts the soul as a babe in the arms of God, along with a 
lot of other preexisting souls gathered around God’s throne. The second 
painting [see the back cover of this issue] is called The Passage, where an 
angel delivers a baby to a mother. Spring Time depicts a growing boy and 
his feminine counterpart; throughout the poem they have a platonic and 
eternal relationship. In The Recollection of Heaven, they go forth in life, 
and even though they have a veil drawn over their memory, there’s still a 
distant recollection that they came from some preexistent realm. These 
murals are heavily influenced, artistically, by Catholic images—but obvi-
ously this artist didn’t read Augustine very carefully (laughter).
Givens: And that first Janmot mural would have made for a more authentic 
book cover illustration. The illustration that I used by William Blake 
looks like it depicts the preexistence, but it actually doesn’t have anything 
to do with it. It’s about the third temptation of Christ.
Welch: Well, maybe the second edition can have the Janmot mural as the 
cover.
Givens: However, Blake did personally believe in the preexistence. Actually, 
his is my favorite defense of the preexistence. He said to his friend, “Obvi-
ously, I acquired my talents in the preexistence. Look, do you really think 
18. John W. Welch and James V. Garrison, “The ‘Hymn of the Pearl’: An Ancient 
Counterpart to ‘O My Father,’” BYU Studies 36, no. 1 (1996–97): 127–38.
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I could have become this much of a genius in just the thirty years that I’ve 
lived here?” (laughter).
Welch: Very good. Let’s now turn to the audience for questions.
Audience question: Blake also illustrated a poem called “Brave” in 1809. 
There, Blake depicts preexistent souls, both male and female, coming 
to earth, then being resurrected as male and female as they move on to 
the next life. Blake’s songs are filled with poems about children who are 
abused in this world—taken away from the purity they enjoyed in the 
presence of God. Mormonism has defended the innocence of children 
about as strongly as any religious tradition I can think of. An idea blos-
soms in multiple places at the same time, concurrent with the Restora-
tion of the gospel, affirming the preexistence. Augustinianism, which 
had held sway for centuries, was suddenly repudiated. So the question 
this all implies is, How does the idea of preexistence change the way we 
think about children and the character of mortality that grows out of that 
childhood?
Givens: Jean-Jacques Rousseau is usually credited with being the father of 
this idea, the innocence of children. But there’s an antecedent to this in the 
seventeenth century among the Cambridge Platonists, which Mormons 
should really know more about. Here we have a group of clergymen at 
Cambridge teaching the innocence and purity of children, denying origi-
nal sin, teaching preexistence, and affirming the deification of humans. 
So it seems that one has to repudiate original sin in order to establish that 
kind of connection between preexistent memories and the innocence 
that is shaped from those memories. Such a connection is natural and is 
made by Wordsworth and by the Cambridge Platonists.
Audience question: You mentioned the newly discovered Awman revela-
tion and the revelation about spirits emanating from God. Augustine 
and, later, the Calvinists rejected the notion of premortality because 
they said that the concept of coeternal man detracted from the absolute 
omnipotence of God. Today, some complain that Mormons overempha-
size the independent nature of premortal spirits and thereby diminish the 
power of God. If we bring together these newly discovered revelations 
and D&C 93, we have a story where spirits or intelligences are both eter-
nally independent and at some later point emanate from God—probably 
through a spirit birth process. To me, this is an incredibly elegant way of 
grappling with the questions concerning the omnipotence of God versus 
the agency of man. Your thoughts?
Givens: Well, I think in some ways that’s a nice compromise. You can 
have preexistence without detracting from the supremacy of God 
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himself. Orson Pratt, for example, would have been very amenable to 
this approach. You know, there’s one huge complication in the Mormon 
history of preexistence that I’ll be dealing with in my forthcoming theol-
ogy book. The problem is this: the idea that we are literal spirit progeny 
of Heavenly Parents is nowhere present in the teachings of Joseph Smith. 
That development takes place with Parley P. Pratt. Orson Pratt gets it from 
Parley, then Brigham Young quotes the Pratts, and every prophet since 
then quotes Brigham Young. But in the King Follett discourse, Joseph 
Smith clearly describes an adoptive model. There are all these preexistent 
entities, whether you call them intelligences or spirits, they are the same 
thing to Joseph. And then God the Father adopts them into a kind of 
fatherly relationship.
Audience question: Are you saying that the emanation from God is actually 
the adoption in?
Givens: Well, an adoption sounds much closer to what Joseph taught. God 
is not giving birth so much as God is gathering a kind of divine matter 
that already fills the universe.
Welch: Or the emanation could be some sort of coming forth, which takes 
place after the adoption.
Givens: It could be that as well.
Audience question: While researching, did you find any evidence of thinkers 
who were influenced by Hindu or Buddhist traditions?
Givens: Yes. The influence is extremely pronounced among the American 
transcendentalists: Emerson, Alcott, and that whole generation. The 
Transcendental Club launched a journal called The Dial, and they were 
vigorous proponents of preexistence. In their writings, they often linked 
to and borrowed from Eastern traditions.
Audience question: Does the idea of premortal life show up in folk culture?
Givens: In the second-to-last chapter of Wings, I give contemporary folk 
examples, where stories are passed along that are essentially the opposite 
of near-death experiences—a prospective mother has an encounter with 
a premortal spirit right before conceiving, and so on. This is prevalent not 
just among Mormon communities but in other cultures as well.
Audience question: Professor Jesse Hurlbut has enlightened us concerning 
many medieval murals depicting a premortal war in heaven. What are 
the origins and traditions behind these paintings?
Givens: Well, the idea itself of the war in heaven is biblically based. Mor-
mons aren’t the only ones who read the book of Revelation and, of course, 
the harrowing of hell is a very old theme. And Catholics have been 
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celebrating Michaelmas for centuries, which is a celebration of Michael’s 
victory in the war in heaven.
Audience question: As a missionary, I taught an MIT professor of planetary 
science who knew several languages, including Sanskrit. When we taught 
him about the premortal existence, he went and grabbed his translation 
of ancient Hindu scripture from Sanskrit and said, “What you just taught 
is what I’ve translated here.” The passage in question had been interpreted 
by Hindu scholars as an explanation for the transmigration of souls. The 
professor said that the scholars simply got it wrong. The scripture says, in 
Sanskrit, that there was a premortal existence. I’m wondering, did you 
find anything like that in other sacred texts from your study?
Givens: Not from any Eastern traditions, and the whole problem of rein-
carnation and transmigration of souls gets mixed up with preexistence 
all the time. In my book, I tried to describe why I was separating the two 
concepts. One can believe in reincarnation without a premortal existence 
and vice versa. Even Plato at times talks about a linear progression and 
at other times talks about the cyclical nature of incarnation. So I tried to 
confine the book to just preexistence.
Welch: This begs the question, will there be a sequel? The subtitle is “Pre-
mortal Existence in Western Thought.” What about a book on Eastern 
thought? Maybe that’s coming.
Givens: Well, not from me. I think I was overly ambitious enough the first 
time (laughter).
Audience question: I’m interested in your approach. You write to a non-
Mormon audience, but your books clearly have very Mormon themes. 
What are you trying to accomplish in these various communities of read-
ers, Mormon or otherwise?
Givens: Well, in many ways, I’m trying to do what BYU theologian David 
Paulsen is trying to do. He’s working to insinuate Mormonism into a 
broader theological discussion. He’s saying, “Look, there are very impor-
tant elements you’re overlooking, and you can’t tell the whole story unless 
Mormonism is a part of that conversation.” In terms of audience, all of my 
books have been written and directed at non-Mormons, but they tend to 
have an impact, as far as I can gauge, among Mormons who are either at 
the peripheries of orthodoxy or who are just more interested in thinking 
of Mormonism in very broad terms.
  My personal model comes from D&C 49:8. The Lord gives a revela-
tion concerning the mission to the Shakers, where he says that the world 
is under sin, “except those which I have reserved unto myself, holy men 
that ye know not of.” So I get this sense early on in the revelations to 
  V 165Review of When Souls Had Wings
Joseph that there are these other people, and perhaps these other ideas 
and communities, that are inspired and have important pieces or frag-
ments of the Adamic gospel.
  After all, Joseph was very much an eclectic thinker, and if I have any 
kind of agenda, it would be to encourage Mormons to be as open-minded 
and generous as Joseph Smith was, to take him seriously when he said, 
“We take truth wherever it is.” Too often, when people today discover that 
there are, for example, striking similarities between Masonic rituals and 
the Latter-day Saint temple, they lose their heads, right? But Joseph Smith 
was essentially saying, “Well, that’s how I’m going to operate.” Augustine 
observed that the problem with the pagans was that they had all the gold 
of the Egyptians, but they didn’t know the context of that gold. Likewise, 
we need to take our materials and put them back into this comprehensive, 
vortexlike understanding of the gospel.
Welch: No small agenda (laughter). Well, I think this would be a perfect 
place for us to end. We thank everyone, thank our panel, and especially 
thank Terryl for taking time with us this afternoon (applause).
Terryl L. Givens is Professor of Literature and Religion and the James A. Bostwick 
Chair of English at the University of Richmond. He received his PhD at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina–Chapel Hill.
James L. Siebach is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Brigham Young University. 
He received his PhD in philosophy and classical languages from the University of 
Texas–Austin.
Dana M. Pike is Professor of Ancient Scripture at Brigham Young University. He 
received his PhD from the University of Pennsylvania.
Jesse D. Hurlbut is Associate Professor of French at Brigham Young University. He 
received his PhD from Indiana University.
David B. Paxman is Professor Emeritus of English at Brigham Young University. He 
received his PhD from the University of Chicago.
All contributors can be reached via email at byustudies@byu.edu.
